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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the meaning of Levinas’ ‘the
other’, and the relation between this and the Christian teaching
about the other. Levinas and the theme of ‘the other’ have been
discussed among many thinkers, yet its meaning remains elusive.
Levinas’ works are still open to new interpretations from readers.
As one of Levinas’ readers, I want to translate Levinas’ ‘the other’
into the concrete person – the neighbor.  By this translation of ‘the
other’ to ‘the neighbor,’ I see a possibility of how to relate Levinas’
thought to the teaching of Christianity concerning the neighbor. I
will also discuss the need of being ready to respond responsibly
to the call of the other, our neighbor.
I
Reading Levinas’ texts always compels readers to question whether
they have understood him correctly. Levinas’ philosophy always remains
open for different interpretations, or to use Gadamer’s words: “All read-
ing that is understanding is always a kind of reproduction and interpreta-
tion” (Gadamer, 1975, p.142).  This, for Colin Davis, is called “Levinas
effect” which means “the ability of the Levinasian text to appear differently
to each of its readers” (Davis, 1996, p.140).  For Peperzak, “his writings
force us to a discussion through which our own thought and action can be
renewed” (Peperzak, 2000, p.184).  I am just one of many readers of
Levinas’ texts, and I expect that my reading Levinas’ the other in Christian
context will take place, as in Gadamer’s words, and open for “the fusion
of these horizons” (Gadamer, 1975, p.273).
For Christianity, what, or who is the other? This question is quite
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complicated.  On one hand, to understand Levinas’ the other would ulti-
mately be to betray Levinas’ understanding of it. Further, the understand-
ing of the other, is quite a difficult task, and for Christianity even more
difficult.  Who speaks on the behalf of Christianity? I agree with Peperzak
when he says, “Who could boast of having a total knowledge of Levinasian
thought at one’s disposal, or venture to say that one can grasp the entirety
of Christian thinking “in one’s own words” and thoughts?” (Peperzak,
2000, p.184).  Therefore, what I want to do is to try to find the place of
Levinas’ the other in the teaching of Christianity.  For this study I have no
aim to construct any system of thought, or try to found theological basis
from two different traditions.  I just try to find the possibility of reading
Levinas’ the other in the Christian context.
II
What does Levinas mean by the “Other”? Levinas uses the term the
“Other” (autre) to  refer to alterity, or otherness in general, and the “other”
(autrui) to refer to the personal other, or the other person.  Levinas puts
ethics as first philosophy prior to ontology, and his ethics begins at the
encounter with the other in society.  In the encounter with the other, Levinas’
philosophy of ethics gives priority to the other.  The primacy of ethics over
ontology, according to Levinas, is the ethical relation with the other, in
which this relation shows itself as the movement from the “I” toward the
other, never to return to the “I.”  So true for Western philosophy, it has to
move from the same to the other and never return to the same.  The
example he likes to use is the contrast between the story of Ulysses who
always returns to Ithaca, and the story of Abraham, who wanders from
his fatherland and never returns to his homeland.
Western philosophy, like the myth of Ulysses, is always nostalgic,
always returns to the place where it leaves.  Levinas says: “A work con-
ceived radically movement of the same unto the other which never returns
to the same.  To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to
oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet
unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his son to the
point of departure” (TTO, 348).  The movement from the same to the
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other and never return to the same, for Levinas, is the radical, and at the
same time, irreversible movement.  Levinas is perhaps pushing Western
tradition towards the Jewish tradition, so that the Greek and the Jewish
traditions could be bridged.
Levinas sees that Western philosophy from Parminedes to Heidegger
has no place for otherness, and on the contrary strives to overcome oth-
erness of the other by transmuting it into the same.  Levinas, in Totality
and Infinity, writes: “Western philosophy has most often been an ontol-
ogy: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and
neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (TI, 43).  Levinas
believes that Western philosophy is, in the end, often a projection of total-
ity (especially apparent in Heidegger’s ‘Being’ or Hegel’s ‘Absolute Spirit’).
This philosophy has the tendency to absorb the otherness of the other into
the structure of the system.  For Levinas, this project will begin at
“thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable,
are not at peace with the other but in suppression or possession of the
other, for possession affirms the other, but within a negation of its inde-
pendence.  “I think” comes down to “I can” – to an appropriation of what
is, to an exploitation of reality.  Ontology as first philosophy is a philoso-
phy of power” (TI, 46).  Levinas puts Western philosophy into question,
and his critical view of Heidegger’s ontology and Hegelian totality as the
philosophy of power is his main point of departure.
Levinas seems to see Western philosophy exemplified by Hegelian
totality, and he wants to break up this totality and give a place for the
otherness of the other.  He confessed that his critique of totality came after
a political experience that we have not yet forgotten (EI, 78-79).  His
experience of the Holocaust is his basic motivation for the move from
totality to otherness.  Whereas Western philosophy reduces all difference
to the same, Levinas’ philosophy of ethics poses the question of totality
and the concept of being open to otherness of the other without returning
to the same.  He says, “The Other as Other has nothing in common with
the Same; it is not thinkable in a synthesis; there is an impossibility here of
making comparisons and synchronizations…. And the ethical relationship
no longer has to be subordinated to ontology or to the thinking of being”
(GT, 127).  For Levinas, the idea of the other is not the enemy of the same
and its alterity does not bring us to the play of dialectic (LR, 209).  The
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dialectic is avoided so that the other will not be absorbed again into total-
ity in which Levinas attempts to depart.  The otherness of the other, for
Levinas, is beyond any synthesis, any comparison, and any thematizability.
What is the otherness of Christianity? If Christianity places other
religions as the other, how is Christianity oriented towards other religions?
Is it possible to apply Levinas’ criticism to Western philosophy to Chris-
tian theology? Then the question of the meaning and significance of other
religions should concern the Christian theologian. In the world religions,
Christianity has to accept truly and sincerely that Christianity is only one of
other religions, and the plurality of religions is no mistake.  The history of
Christian Church in the period under the domination of mono-political
theology allowed no place for other faiths resulting in violence and war.
The presence of other religions seemed to be considered as a sign of the
lack of efficiency of evangelization. Further, the sense of superiority im-
plicit in colonialism tended to denigrate the diversity of cultures and reli-
gions. Then the mistrust of plurality and the oppression of the other be-
come the source of conflict among people in both the same culture and
between cultures. Christianity, then, should have to begin again, with open-
ness to the presence of the other religions.  The difference among religions
should not be a cause for concern, but on the contrary, it should be an
opportunity for mutural enrichment.  A fruitful dialogue among religions
has to begin with the acceptance of the presence of the other.
III
Levinas’ philosophy of ethics begins with the priority of human rela-
tion in society, namely, the priority of the other person over the ‘I.’ The
other, according to Levinas, is the other human being (IB, 171).  If  West-
ern philosophy moves from the same to the other and never returns to the
same, the ethical relation, for Levinas, also has to move from the ‘I’ to the
other person without returning to the ‘I.’  For Levinas, the relationship
between me and the other is asymmetrical, like the irreversibility of time
(IB, 118).  The ‘I’ is not the last word, and the ‘I’ or the self, for Levinas,
seems to be the most problematic of  Western philosophy.  He says, “The
I is the very crisis of the being of a being (l’être de l’étant) in the human…
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I already ask myself whether my being is justified, whether the Da of my
Dasein is not already the usurpation of someone’s place” (AT, 28).  Con-
cerning the ‘I’, Levinas echoes what Pascal said long time ago in Pensées,
“The self is hateful” (Pascal, 1995, 494).  Pascal’s the hateful ‘I’ directs
Levinas to depart from the self and places the other prior to the self.
Modern Western philosophy begins with Descartes’ Cogito – a foun-
dation which has no place for the other.  But for Levinas, “In positing the
relation with the Other as ethical, one surmounts a difficulty that would be
inevitable if, contrary to Descartes, philosophy started from a cogito that
would posit itself absolutely independent of the Other” (TI, 210).  For
Descartes, knowledge begins with the thinking subject, and the self be-
comes the source of his epistemological foundation.  The other becomes
the object for self-reflection, and so the other is not absolutely the other.
For Levinas, the absolutely other is not reflected in consciousness.  It
resists it to the point that even its resistance is not converted into a content
of consciousness (TTO, 352-353).  To give priority to the other is to put
the self into question as he says, “The proximity of the other, origin of all
putting into question of self” (AT, 99).  When the self is put into question,
according to Levinas, is precisely the welcome of the absolutely other
(TTO, 353).
The other is recognized while the self is put into question, such is the
beginning of Levinas’ philosophy of ethics.  The other is beyond any com-
prehension, or any thematizability, or in other words, the other is beyond
ontological questioning.  The other is neither initially nor ultimately what
we grasp or what we thematize (TI, 172). For Levinas, if we could pos-
sess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other.  Possessing, know-
ing, and grasping are synonyms of power (TO, 90).  The other, for Levinas,
is not a part of any program of knowledge and power.  We could not
reduce the other to be the same, and we could not possess the other
because the other is beyond our grasp.  Levinas says, “The relationship
with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility” (TO, 76).
 Levinas’ philosophy moves radically beyond ontological relation,
and his irreducibility of the other becomes the total departure from the self
without any return.  For Levinas, “the departure from the self is the ap-
proach to the neighbour” (LR, 246).  This approach to the other is to
serve the neighbour.  “To be in oneself is to express oneself, that is, al-
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ready to serve the Other.  The ground of expression is goodness” (TI,
183). To serve the other is an ethical demand from the other to the self
without any return to the self.  It is a kind of going outside the self without
expecting something in return.
For Levinas, an ethical relation with the other is beyond knowledge
and ontology.  The other cannot be put into any category, and if the other
is put into any category, the other is not the other.  Levinas, in his book
Time and the Other, talks about the other that is beyond graspable, or
thematizable, like time.  He sees time as beyond any conceptualizing, and
prior to any understanding.  We experience time but do not possess time,
and we have no power over time.  We experience the other but we could
not possess the other and have no power over the other.
Levinas anticipates time and the other as a mystery (TO, 75).  His
positing of time and the other as mystery leads him to give us an account
of the relationship with the other as the relationship with the future.  The
future seems to be completely unknowable, and beyond our grasp.  The
future is always beyond any expectation, and it is still the mystery of man-
kind.  The future that we can talk of is only a presencing of the future, not
the real future.  Levinas says, “The future is what is in no way grasped….
The other is the future.  The very relationship with the other is the relation-
ship with the future” (TO, 76-77).  Levinas does not want to define the
other by the future, but the future by the other (TO, 82).  When Levinas
connects the other with time, he seems to accept the limit of human knowl-
edge to take account of these two concepts.  Actually, Levinas does not
mean the other and time in form of concepts, but something prior to our
conceptualization.  He prefers to use the term ‘alterity’ of the other.
For Levinas, the alterity of the other must be respected at the mo-
ment of the encounter between human beings.  Otherwise we are tempted
to appropriate the other into the same, reducing it to an object.  The other
will not be absolutely other if the alterity of the other is not recognized.
Levinas says, “I think that the true humanity of man begins in this recogni-
tion, before any cognition of being, before onto-logy.  That is why I said to
you that the question of the other seemed to me to be anterior to the
problem of ontology” (IB, 106).  For Levinas, the irreducibility of the
alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between
human beings begins.  This is not ontology for the sake of understanding,
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or knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but it is ethics, or goodness in
which the alterity of the other is fully respected.  Any program of reduction
of the other to the same, or the return to the self, has to be put into ques-
tion.
For Christianity, who is the other? The other person, or the ‘neigh-
bor’ seems to be the point where Levinas and Christianity intersect, more
specifically: inseparability between the love of God and the love of neigh-
bor. Levinas’ ethics obliges us to approach our neighbor with love without
concupiscence, and this asymmetrical relation has to move from the self to
the other without returning to the self.  For Christianity, Jesus Christ is the
clear witness of this sacrificial love for the other person.  Then to give
priority to the other without trying to concern much of self-salvation is the
way that Christians can build up their relationship to God through their
neighbors.  Our love of God is made practical through our love of our
neighbor.  Christians could not say that he loves God by being indifferent
to the other.  “Anyone who says, ‘I love God’, and hates his brother, is a
liar, since a man who does not love the brother that he can see cannot love
God, whom he has never seen” (1 Jn 4: 20).
Levinas’ philosophy of ethics in general seems to be the articulation
of this love of the neighbor.  This seems to be the most direct form of
ethical relation which begins at the encounter with the face of the other.
The face of the other is not an obstacle but an obligation.  This obligation
commands me not to let the other die in solitude as he says: “no face can
be approached with empty hands and closed home” (TI, 172).  Therefore
the love of neighbor is not just the principle but it is the deed.  You should
‘love your neighbor’ is not the same as ‘love your neighbor’.  And this
love of neighbor has to begin with their material needs such as welcoming
a stranger, clothing those who are naked, giving a drink to those who are
thirsty, feeding those who are hungry, etc.  Dostoyevsky, in The Brothers
Karamazov, says: “Strive to love your neighbor actively and constantly.
In so far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of God
and of the immortality of your soul.  If you attain perfect self-forgetfulness
in the love of your neighbor, then you will believe without doubt.  Doubt
will no longer be able to enter your soul” (Dostoyevsky, 1999, p.64).
If Levinas and Christianity mutually agree with each other about how
to do before the other, then it is not difficult to see how Levinas’ philoso-
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phy of ethics can play even in the teaching of Christianity. He speaks little
about ‘love’ but he prefers to use the word ‘responsible’ because the
word ‘love’ can quite easily lead us to return to the self.  We have to be
responsible for the other and our responsible is not limited by any condi-
tion.  If Christianity holds Jesus Christ as the model of their life, then to
carry the cross and follow Jesus Christ means to be responsible for all
men’s sins.  Salvation is not supposed to be a private affair.  I think that
Levinas follows the teaching of the elder, Father Zossima in The Brothers
Karamazov, who says, “There is only one means of salvation. Make
yourself responsible for all men’s sins.  As soon as you sincerely make
yourself responsible for everything and for all men, you will see at once
that you have found salvation” (Dostoyevsky, 1999, p.310).  Levinas
stresses this form of responsibility which is not demanded from the other
but from our self.
Christianity and Levinas speak in the same language concerning the
identity of the other. It is our neighbor, the stranger, the poor, the widow,
and the orphan, etc.  This is the answer of Jesus Christ when tested by the
lawyer, who asks the question: Who is the neighbor? (Lk 10: 29-37) The
story of the Good Samaritan opens the line that draws the distinction
between the Jews and the Samaritan.  Even though Jesus was expelled
from Samaria a couple weeks before this story, and even James and John
asked Jesus to bring fire from heaven to burn this town, Jesus makes this
good example to redefine the meaning of neighbor beyond any line of
race, ethnicity and country.  Neighbor is not just someone who lives around
our house, is not just someone we are familiar with, but she/he is the one
who stands in front of us.  We have to be ready for the presence of the
other.  The teaching in the Gospel in many parts such as the story of the
wise and the foolish bridesmaids (Mt 25: 1-13), or in the Gethsemane
when Jesus urges his disciple to stay awake with him (Mt 26: 36-46),
points out the significance of always being wakeful.  Levinas takes into
account of being vigilant or to be wakeful, not for the second coming of
Jesus Christ but the coming of the other.  Then in the next part I will try to
study the possibility of the relation between Levinas’ vigilant ethics and
Christianity’s wakefulness.
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IV
Levinas’ philosophy of ethics begins at the encounter with the other
person, and this encounter puts the self into question.  The calling into
question of self-existing is the ethical, and he begins his philosophy of
ethics with the response “Here I am.”  This is the response to God from
Abraham (Gn 22:2), from Samuel (1 S 3:4), from Isaiah (Is 6:9), and
others.  Levinas seems to use this as the paradigm for his ethical response
to the other person as well.  According to him, I have to respond “Here I
am” to the other and in this response it puts myself into question and
opens myself totally for the other.  The disclosure of the self is to be ready
for the call of the other, and the response “Here I am” is an ethical re-
sponse of responsibility.  I could not allow myself to sleep because I have
to be ready for the call.  Samuel was awakened by the three calls of
Yahweh, and his answer “Speak, Yahweh, your servant is listening” (1 S
3:9) is supposed to be my response to the other as well.  The call actually
dismisses the self and brings the other into my place.  The call always
interrupts my self-existing.  The call of my own being is challenged by the
call of the other.  The call of the other always asks for a sacrifice to the
other.  This is the call to holiness as Levinas says, “The call to holiness
preceding the concern for existing, for being-there and being-in-the-world”
(EN, 216).  At the moment I hear the call, I have to respond, and Levinas
asks me to respond responsibly.  Actually I can exercise my freedom to
say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to that call, but for Levinas, that call implements an ethi-
cal demand that I cannot leave the other alone and enjoys my own solitary
existence.  But I have to respond: “Here I am,” and this response is an
obligation, not a choice.  Cohen says,
This moral insomnia reminds us of an other of Levinas’s formulae
for the psyche, the biblical expression, “here I am” (Hebrew:
hineni), referring to an availability, a vulnerability, a responsive-
ness to the call of the other.  God calls Abraham, and Abraham
responds: “Here I am.”  Abraham calls Isaac, and Isaac responds:
“Here I am.”  “Here I am” – already a sacrifice.  Insomniac, the
self is wakened by the other and for the other, by its obligations to
and for the other. (Cohen, 2001, p.204)
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“Here I am” is passively receiving the command from God, and for
Levinas, it is also the paradigmatic response to the other.  Levinas uses the
prophet’s response to God as the template for our ethical relationship to
the other person.  For Levinas, the other is not God, but through the
epiphany of the other’s face I hear the word of God.  He quotes Matthew
25 (IB, 52), concerning the Last Judgment, in which we will be judged
according to what we do to our neighbor, not to God directly – acts such
as giving a drink to those who are thirsty, feeding those who are hungry,
welcoming a stranger, clothing those who are naked, visiting those who
are sick, or are in prison.  God will say to those who act accordingly to
neighbors: “I tell you solemnly, in so far as you did this to one of the least
of these brothers of mine, you did it to me” (Mt 25:40), and on the con-
trary God will say to those who deny their neighbors: “I tell you solemnly,
in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you
neglected to do it to me” (Mt 25:45).  As to the question about the relation
between God and the other, Levinas says:
I cannot describe the relation to God without speaking of my con-
cern for the other.  When I speak to a Christian, I always quote
Matthew 25: the relation to God is presented there as a relation to
another person.  It is not a metaphor; in the other, there is a real
presence of God.  In my relation to the other, I hear the word of
God.  It is not a metaphor.  It is not only extremely important; it is
literally true.  I’m not saying that the other is God, but that in his or
her face I hear the word of God. (IB, 171)
When Levinas mentions the teachings in the Gospel, Matthew 25,
he is reminding us that the way we treat the other is the way we treat God.
The infinite is revealed through the other.  He often refers to the Jewish
proverb: “the other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.” Ethical rela-
tion, for Levinas, begins at the response to the other’s material needs.  To
feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to
the shelterless, are my responsibility.  Holiness begins with ‘practical’ mo-
rality.  And he stresses that practical morality is essentially based on an
ethical relation which cannot be separated from human relationships.  He
says, “I have been speaking about that which stands behind practical
morality; about the extraordinary relation between a man and his neighbour,
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a relation that continues to exist even when it is severely damaged” (LR,
247).
Through our ethical relation to the other, we are truly in relation to
God.  For Levinas, “The trace of the infinite is inscribed in my obligation
toward the other, in this moment that corresponds to the call” (AT, 106).
The call of the other and our response is the beginning of our spiritual
growth, and we could not approach the other with empty hands.  He
writes: “That the glory of the Infinite is glorified only by the signification of
the-one-for-the-other, as sincerity, that in my sincerity the Infinite passes
the finite, that the Infinite comes to pass there, is what makes the plot of
ethics primary, and what make language irreducible to an act among acts”
(OB, 150).   Then the glory of the Infinite will be glorified by our response
“Here I am” to strangers, widows, orphans, neighbors.  Through the
epiphany of the face of the other, God leaves a trace, and for Levinas “to
know God is to do justice to the neighbour” (GT, 199).
At the moment I hear the call, Levinas’ philosophy of ethics plays the
central role in my conscience, and it reminds me of the primacy of the
other over me.  The call of the other replaces the call of my own being, the
other’s call ruptures any coherent idea of systematic ethics. The call to
sacrifice myself for the other is always prior to an exercise of my freedom.
I am not free before the call of the other, and I have to respond responsi-
bly “Here I am” for the other. Levinas’ ethical is always attached to the
other person, and without even prior knowledge of the other, if I hear the
call, I have to answer.  If I close myself to his or her call, I will be judged
in the manner of Matthew 25 where my service to the other is always
prior to any other ethical principle.
Levinas’ philosophy of ethics teaches me not to separate ethical com-
mandment from the openness to this call of the other.  I could not live
securely in a closed-home but I have to open the door to welcome my
unknown guest, as Abraham welcomed the three men warmly and re-
spectively by saying, “My lord, I beg you, if I find favour with you, kindly
do not pass our servant by.  A little water shall be brought; you shall wash
your feet and lie down under the tree.  Let me fetch a little bread and you
shall refresh yourselves before going further.  That is why you have come
in your servant’s direction” (Gn 18:3-5).  For Caputo, this is the law of the
land of the Semitic world, or the law of God, and he questions whether it
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is the same law.  To welcome the stranger like Abraham welcomes the
three men is to welcome God.  Caputo says,
In the Semitic world of desert wanderers, nothing is more impor-
tant than hospitality.  Hospitality is the fundamental condition of
survival, an unconditional necessity of life.  The duty owed the
wanderer and the stranger is holy and inviolable, and without it the
world of wanderers would perish by its own hand.  To provide a
place of respite and refuge, to offer bread and water, even to take
food out of one’s own mouth in order to share it with the stranger,
in short, to make welcome, that is the law of the land, indeed, that
is the law of God (Are these the same law? Is it the one law
because it is the other?).  The traveler who appears at our door is
marked by God, who has signed the face of the stranger and placed
him or her under divine protection.  The one who receives the
stranger receives God and bears the mark of “the God who loves
the stranger.” (Caputo, 2000, p.276)
This clarifies the relation between the dramatic event of Abraham
and Levinas’ philosophy of ethics, which Levinas does not limit to the law
of the land of the Semitic world, but attempts to translate into an ethics of
humanity. Levinas’ philosophy of ethics obliges me to be open to the call
of the other, and my ethical response must begin with the saying “Here I
am.”  I have to be always wakeful and vigilant to the call of the other and
I have to respond responsibly to the call which always comes to me be-
fore my choice.  I am chosen to receive the call, and for me this seems to
be the divine call, which is the call of stranger I have to welcome, or the
call of prisoner I have to visit, or the call of those who are hungry  I have
to feed, or the call of those who are naked I have to clothe.
V
Reading Levinas’ philosophy of ethics leads us to deal with his reli-
gious point of view.  He accepts that his highest aim in philosophy of ethics
is holiness, and this ideal of holiness seems to be the ultimate aim of hu-
manity.  I am not surprised to see that the other, for Levinas, is the stranger,
the widow, and the orphan (TI, 215); (AT, 97).  These are the people
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behind Levinas’ other, and when he mentions a Jewish proverb: ‘the other’s
material needs are my spiritual needs,’ he means it is necessary to begin
ethics not with theoretical ontology, but with sensible morality.  He does
not aim at the rational principle as in Kantian ethics, but for him, ethics
arises in relation to the other and not straightaway by a reference to the
universality of a law (IB, 114).  Ethics, for Levinas is all about goodness,
mercy, and charity.  And this ethics, or the relation with the other, is ac-
complished through service and  hospitality (TI, 300).  He adds, “I am for
the other in a relationship of deaconship: I am in service to the other” (GT,
161).  If these sentences reflect Levinas’ philosophy of ethics, we could
say his philosophy of ethics begins with service to the other: the stranger,
the widow, and the orphan.  Levinas echoes the words from the Mount of
Sinai when he says: The alterity of the other is the extreme point of the
“Thou shalt not kill” (EN, 169).  This commandment does not mean only
not to kill the other, but also to defend the life of the other.  For Levinas, it
is not just a matter of mortality of the other that we have to defend but also
the living of the other that we are called for.  The other, therefore, is al-
ways my concern.
For my part, I do not think that Christianity can reject the signifi-
cance of this call.  Jesus Christ, in his summary of the whole law, says, You
must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul,
and with all your mind.  This is the greatest and the first commandment.
The second resembles it: You must love your neighbour as yourself.
On these two commandments hangs the whole Law, and the Prophets
also.” (Mt 22: 37-40).  This is not just an ethical principle, but it is a
commandment. Both the two commandments go together.  We could not
accept the first without the second, which means “anyone who loves God
must also love his brother” (1Jn 4: 21).  This is not a guiding principle or a
theoretical statement that you ‘ought’ to love your neighbour, but it is the
commandment: you ‘must’ love your neighbor.  The other is your neighbour
to whom you have to be wakeful to receive his or her call.  Levinas often
says, “You cannot let the other die in solitude,” and you have to help the
other even “take the food from our own mouth.”  The calling of our neigh-
bor whether Jewish or Christian is a divine call, and we cannot ‘not’ re-
spond.  The needs of our neighbor are always our responsibility.  Chris-
tianity and Levinas concur with each other concerning the significance of
Kajornpat Tangyin  63
the calling of the other.  We are chosen to receive the calling of the other,
and the Biblical tradition reminds us to receive the call with the holy word:
“Here I am.”
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ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are in use throughout this article referring to
works by Levinas.
AT Alterity and Transcendence. Michael B. Smith. (Trans.). New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
EI Ethics and Infinity. Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Quezon City:
Claretian Publications, 1985.
EN Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. Michael B. Smith &
Barbara Harshav. (Trans.). New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998.
GT God, Death, and Time. Bettina Bergo. (Trans.). Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000.
IB Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas. Jill
Robbins (Ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
LR The Levinas Reader. Seán Hand (Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.OB
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Alphonso Lingis.
64  Prajñâ Vihâra
(Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
TI Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Alphonso Lingis.
(Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
TO Time and the Other. Richard A. Cohen. (Trans.). Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1987.
TTO The Trace of the Other. In Mark C. Taylor (Ed.). Deconstruction
in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Alphonso Lingis.
(Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 345-
359.
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